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In the theory of optimization, there is a still-growing field of the game theory.
This part of mathematics was first developed as a separate field by John von
Neuman in late 1920’s and later famously followed by John Forbes Nash Jr. and
others throughout the 20th century. This field of mathematics, as the name
suggests, focuses on the study of games, but not just games in a common sense,
such as chess or poker, but in more general sense as competitive situations. This
found many applications from economics and political science to psychology and
biology. The modern game theory reshaped how we think about competitions in
the real world.
The game theory studies various types of games and in 20th century its subject
grew from the original study of zero-sum competitions by von Neuman to a large
and diverse number of cases. The most important characteristics of games are as
follows.






















Games by the representation of the game
Normal-form games Extensive-form games
Games by the payoff
Constant-sum games Non-constant sum games
Although, there are many different categories and subcategories for each of
those types of games, in this thesis, we will further focus on the theory of constant-
sum two-player competitive games and more specifically on the theory of matrix
games. We primarily focus on the case when the matrix is random. For such
a situation there is no longer single way to define an optimal strategy, as is
the case for deterministic matrix games. We therefore have to specify a suitable
solution model, which takes on the problem of uncertain payoff with some specific
assumptions (axioms). From this we have multiple possible approaches to classify
optimal solutions of such games.
Review of used literature
The main basis for our work on the deterministic constant-sum games in the first
chapter is [7]. We also briefly mention [9], that shows the connection between
dominance and rationality of players. For more theoretical results in the theory
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of dominance we refer to [11], [6], [8] and [10], where authors provided several
approaches and discussed properties of iterated dominance in general games. In
[11], [6] and [8] authors defined the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies and studied its properties, mainly the existence and uniqueness of the
maximal reduction. In [10] authors studied more general version of such proce-
dures in a general choice problem and provided satisfactory conditions for their
uniqueness.
The theory of games with random payoff is somewhat less developed than
the theory of deterministic games, main works, that we mention and discuss their
results in this thesis are [5], [4], [3] and [2]. First of the mentioned papers discusses
the theory of matrix games with random payoff with joint probabilistic constrains
and its main results for the general case are the relations of the two optimization
problems that are solved by the first and the second player. The second paper is
the original work that developed the theory of matrix games with random payoff.
In their paper authors generalize deterministic optimization problems, that are
solved by the two players to the case of random payoff and prove that those
problems have deterministic equivalents. In [3], authors give different approach to
generalization of the deterministic problem, which is ’less cautious’ and no longer
defends against the worst payoff, but instead it defends against the least likely
payoff, that is, it optimizes the payoff subject to the minimal probability of it
happening. Authors use individual constrains and prove general properties of this
problem and relations between the payoff maximizing and confidence maximizing
problems, from that they are able to formulate a solution algorithm for the payoff
maximizing problem in games with random matrix with continuous distribution.
The last reviewed paper was [2], which discusses the results for the least likely
payoff constrained models with joint constrains under the assumption of a specific
distribution of elements of payoff matrix. Main results of this paper are equivalent
deterministic problems for payoff and confidence maximizing models. In [1], the
general results of theory of stochastic programming, that we use to formulate
equivalent deterministic programs in the cases of discrete distributions with finite
support are formulated.
Structure of the thesis
In the second chapter we discuss the general theory of constant-sum games and of
their optimal strategies. We formulate the basic definitions and provide examples
for their special cases. We present results developed in [7] for the zero-sum games
and show how they may be used to study general constant-sum games. After
that, we define a strict dominance and discuss its basic results. Lastly, we discuss
the implications of those results for the case of matrix games and formulate the
optimization problem, that the players in a matrix games want to solve together
with its equivalent formulation.
In the third chapter we further develop the theory of matrix games by in-
troducing the randomness of payoff. We present and categorize several different
models, which are used in the case of random payoff. Mainly, we distinguish be-
tween the models, which are based on the characteristics of the payoff and more
complex models based on the theory of stochastic optimization. We present the
model of expected payoff and as an alternative to it the model of naive quan-
tile payoff. Then we formulate different models based on the theory of chance-
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constrained programming and using the results of stochastic optimization, we
formulate equivalent deterministic mixed-integer programs for the case when the
payoff matrix has a discrete distribution with finitely many values.
In the fourth chapter we formulate a real-world motivated problem, which
may be interpreted in the sense of a matrix game with random payoff and solve
it using different approaches presented in the third chapter. On this example we
show the differences between the models and also point out the importance of




In this chapter we take a closer look at the case of the deterministic constant-
sum games, terminology related to them and their properties. After that, we will
discuss implications of those results in the case of matrix games and lastly, we
will formulate the optimization problem, that players want to solve in a matrix
game.
2.1 Basic terminology for games with constant
sum
Definition 1 (The two-player constant-sum game). Let S1 and S2 be non-empty
sets of strategies of the first and the second player respectively and u = (u1, u2) :
S1 × S2 → R2 be the game’s payoff function. The triple:
G = (S1, S2, u),
we call a two-player game with a constant sum, if ∀s1 ∈ S1, ∀s2 ∈ S2 : u1(s1, s2) =
−u2(s1, s2) + c for some c ∈ R, where ui denotes the payoff function of the player
i.
An important special case of a constant-sum game is the zero-sum game for
c = 0. In this case ∀s1 ∈ S1, ∀s2 ∈ S2 : u1(s1, s2) = −u2(s1, s2), thus for the
simplicity we explicitly define only the payoff function of the first player
u : S1 × S2 → R
and the payoff function of the second player then implicitly is −u.
In general S1 and S2 may be abstract sets of strategies that can players play.
An important categorization of games is given by the following definition.
Definition 2 (Sets of strategies). Let G = (S1, S2, u) be a two-player game with
a constant sum,
1. if S1 and S2 are sets of different actions that can each player take, we call
this a game in pure strategies. In this case, we will use the notation P
instead of S1 and Q instead of S2, p ∈ P , q ∈ Q we call a pure strategy of
the first and second player respectively.
2. If






λx(p) = 1, ∀p ∈ P : λx(p) ≥ 0}
and






λy(q) = 1, ∀q ∈ Q : λy(q) ≥ 0},
we will call this game a game in mixed strategies and use the notation of X
instead of S1 and Y instead of S2, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y we call a mixed strategy
of the first and second player respectively.
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As we will later see, categorization of games based on Definition 2 is crucial
for us, as results for games in pure strategies differ from results for games in
mixed strategies.
It is handy to think about mixed strategies as probability distributions over
the set of pure strategies, as this interpretation is best applicable in practical
results of finding optimal strategies, where player can play only single action at a
time, but in many repetitions of the play and focuses on finding the strategy which
yields him the highest payoff in the long-term. This intuition may be used to solve
repeating games using the methods of non-repeating games. Mixed strategy may
also represent an intensity indicating for example the split of resources by each
player.
The payoff function for the game in mixed strategies is defined through the
payoff function for the game in pure strategies as follows:






where P and Q are the sets of pure strategies and x = ∑︁p∈P λx(p)p and y =∑︁
q∈Q λy(q)q are convex combinations of pure strategies. This may be also re-
garded as an expected payoff and comes from the idea, that each mixed strategy
is just a probability distribution over pure strategies.
Definition 3 (Two-player matrix game). Let m, n ∈ N. The two-player zero-
sum game is called a two-player matrix game, if S1 ⊆ Rm, S2 ⊆ Rn and ∀s1 ∈
S1, ∀s2 ∈ S2 : u(s1, s2) = sT1 As2 for some m × n matrix A.
• For simplicity we will refer to the two-player matrix game as a ”matrix
game”. In some literature matrix games as a term may include also bima-
trix games, in which the payoffs of the two players are given by different
matrices.
• We will denote I = {1, . . . , m} the set of row indices and J = {1, . . . , n}
the set of column indices of A.
• Even if we did not impose any further criteria on the sets of strategies, other
than the fact, that they are sets of m and n-dimensional real vectors, it is
easy to see, that without loss of generality, from the linearity of the payoff
function, we can just think of sets that are subsets of a convex closure of
the standard basis of Rm and Rn respectively.
• Sets of pure strategies then in a matrix game are P = {p ∈ Rm;∑︁mi=1 pi =
1, pi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ I} and Q = {q ∈ Rn;
∑︁n
j=1 qj = 1, qj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ J}, for
the first and the second player respectively. It is from this that the first and
second player in a matrix game are also referred to as a row or a column
player. For i ∈ I we will write pi ∈ P and mean a pure strategy such that
pi = 1. Similarly for j ∈ J and qj ∈ Q.
• We will use the following notation for a matrix game
G = (S1, S2, uA),
where uA : S1 ×S2 → R denotes the payoff function of the first player given
by the matrix A.
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Example. Sets P = Q = {(0, 1)T , (1, 0)T } and





define a matrix game in pure strategies with payoff matrix A and player
strategy sets P and Q. We see that even though the payoff function was not
clearly defined for this game, we can represent it as a bilinear form defined by
matrix A and for any two actions p ∈ P, q ∈ Q we get uA(p, q) = pT Aq. We can
clearly expand this definition to X = Conv(P ) = Conv(Q) = Y .
2.2 Optimal strategies
Now we will classify optimal strategies and closely related terminology. We will
begin by defining terminology for the constant-sum games and then we will discuss
their interpretations in the case of matrix games.
2.2.1 The best response and the Nash equlibrium
Definition 4 (The best response strategy). Let G = (S1, S2, u) be a constant-
sum game, we define the set of best response strategies of the first player for a
given s2 ∈ S2 as
BR(s2) = {s1 ∈ S1; u1(s1, s2) ≥ u1(s′1, s2), ∀s′1 ∈ S1},
element of BR(s2) is called the best response strategy for the first player given s2.
Similarly for the second player and given s1 ∈ S1
BR(s1) = {s2 ∈ S2; u2(s1, s2) ≥ u2(s1, s′2), ∀s′2 ∈ S2},
element of BR(s1) is called the best response strategy for the second player given
s1.
Best response strategies in a sense of this definition are such strategies, for
which no higher payoff may be achieved with any other strategy, given opponent’s
strategy, but this set may be an empty one, as we will show in the next example.
Example. Let G = (P, Q, u) be a constant sum game with P = (0, 1), Q = (0, 1)
and payoff function u : P × Q → R2 such that for p ∈ P , q ∈ Q : u1(p, q) = p − q
and u2(p, q) = q − p + 1. Clearly this is a well defined constant sum game as
u1(p, q) = −u2(p, q) + 1.
Now let q ∈ Q be given, we will show that BR(q) = ∅. Suppose, that
BR(q) ̸= ∅, so there is such p∗ ∈ P , that for any other p′ ∈ P : u1(p∗, q) ≥ u1(p′, q)
but from definition, P is an open set in R, so that ∀p ∈ P, ∃ϵ > 0 such that
p + ϵ ∈ P . Specially this holds true for p∗ and from definition of u1 we get that
u1(p∗ + ϵ, q) > u1(p∗, q) which is a contradiction. Similar argument may be made
for the second player.
The Definition 4 motivates the definition of a key term in the game theory -
the Nash equilibrium of a game.
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Definition 5 (The Nash equilibrium). Let G = (S1, S2, u) be a constant sum
game then (s∗1, s∗2) ∈ S1 × S2 is called a (Nash) equilibrium of the game G, if
∀s1 ∈ S1∀s2 ∈ S2 : u1(s1, s∗2) ≤ u1(s∗1, s∗2) ∧ u2(s∗1, s2) ≤ u2(s∗1, s∗2).
Or in other words
s∗1 ∈ BR(s∗2) ∧ s∗2 ∈ BR(s∗1).
If G is a game in pure strategies, we say that (s∗1, s∗2) is a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies. Similarly, if G is a game in mixed strategies, we say that (s∗1, s∗2)
is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
In previous example we showed, that the Nash equilibrium might not exist in
a case when sets of pure strategies are infinite. In the following example we will
show that it may not exist in pure strategies, even if those sets are finite.
Example. Let G = (P, Q, u) be a constant sum game in pure strategies such that
P = Q = {0, 1} and u : P × Q → R2 which satisfies
u1(p, q) =
⎧⎨⎩p − 1 if q = 1,−p if q = 0
and
u2(p, q) =
⎧⎨⎩−q if p = 1,q − 1 if p = 0.
It is easy to show that G is a well defined constant sum game with constant
c = −1.
Now suppose the player two plays 1, then the best response for the player one
is to play 1 as well, but if the player one plays 1 the best response for the player
two is to play 0. Similarly, if the player two plays 0 then the best response for
the player one is to play 0, but if the player one plays 0 the best response for
the player two is to play 1, therefore the game has no Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies.
This example also shows that the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies may
not exist, even if sets of best responses are non-empty for both players in every
combination of players’ strategies.
Now, we will formulate some of the results presented in the Chapter 7 of [7].
Definition 6 ([7]; Definition 7.2). Let G = (X, Y, u) be a zero-sum game we
define
1. game’s upper valuation as v∗U := infy∈Y supx∈X u(x, y),
2. game’s lower valuation as v∗L := supx∈X infy∈Y u(x, y).
3. game’s upper value as vU := miny∈Y supx∈X u(x, y),
4. game’s lower value as vL := maxx∈X infy∈Y u(x, y).
8
If vL = vU we say that the game has a value v := vL = vU .
Strategy x∗ ∈ X of the first player is called optimal, if ∀y ∈ Y : u(x∗, y) ≥ v∗L,
strategy y∗ ∈ Y of the second player is called optimal, if ∀x ∈ X : u(x, y∗) ≤ v∗U .
Lemma 1 ([7]; Lemma 7.3.). Every G = (X, Y, u) zero-sum game has an upper
and a lower valuation. Furthermore v∗L ≤ v∗U .
Lemma 2 ([7]; Lemma 7.4.). Let G = (X, Y, u) be a zero-sum game. It follows
that:
1. The first player has at least one optimal strategy, iff the lower value of the
game exists.
2. The second player has at least one optimal strategy, iff the upper value of
the game exists.
For proofs of lemmas 1 and 2 we refer to the [7].
Lemma 3 ([7]; Theorem 7.5.). Let G = (X, Y, u) be a zero-sum game. If X and
Y are compact metric spaces and u : X × Y → R is a continuous function then
game’s upper and lower values exist. Furthermore,
∀x ∈ X∃y∗(x) ∈ Y s.t. u(x, y∗(x)) = min
y∈Y
u(x, y) ∈ R (2.1)
∀y ∈ Y ∃x∗(y) ∈ X s.t. u(x∗(y), y) = max
x∈X










u(x, y) ∈ R (2.4)
Proof. We propose a following proof of this lemma. For a given x ∈ X, u(x, .) :
Y → R is a continuous function on a compact set Y . From the Extreme value
theorem there exists a y∗(x) ∈ Y such that miny∈Y u(x, y) = u(x, y∗(x)) ∈ R.
Similarly for a given y ∈ Y , u(., y) : X → R is a continuous function on a compact
set X, so there exists a x∗(y) ∈ X such that maxx∈X u(x, y) = u(x∗(y), y) ∈ R.
From the Definition 6, vL = maxx∈X u(x, y∗(x)) = maxx∈X miny∈Y u(x, y) ∈ R
and vU = miny∈Y u(x∗(y), y) = miny∈Y maxx∈X u(x, y) ∈ R.
Lemma 4 ([7];Theorem 7.6.). Zero-sum game G = (X, Y, u) has a value, if and
only if it has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. This proof was formulated in [7].
”⇒”: Suppose G has a value v ∈ R. From Lemma 2 there are x∗ ∈ X and y∗ ∈ Y
optimal strategies for the first and the second player respectively, so that
∀x ∈ X, ∀y ∈ Y : u(x, y∗) ≤ v ≤ u(x∗, y). (2.5)
This implies that u(x∗, y∗) ≤ v ≤ u(x∗, y∗), so that v = u(x∗, y∗), because (2.5)
specially holds for x∗ ∈ X and y∗ ∈ Y . And from the Definition 5 (x∗, y∗) ∈ X×Y
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is a Nash equilibrium.Therefore the first implication holds.
”⇐”: Now suppose that G has a Nash equilibrium, that means there is a (x∗, y∗) ∈
X × Y such that ∀x ∈ X, ∀y ∈ Y : u(x, y∗) ≤ u(x∗, y∗) ≤ u(x∗, y).
From Lemma 3 it follows that,
u(x∗, y∗) = min
y∈Y




u(x, y) = v∗L,
u(x∗, y∗) = max
x∈X




u(x, y) = v∗U .
From Lemma 1 we know that v∗L ≤ v∗U so it must be that,








u(x, y) = v∗L = v∗U = vL = vU = v.
That concludes the proof.
Lemma 5 ([7];Theorem 7.7., ”The minimax theorem”). Let G = (X, Y, u) be
a zero-sum game. If X ⊆ Rn and Y ⊆ Rm are compact convex sets and u :
X × Y → R be a continuous function, concave in x ∈ X and convex in y ∈ Y
then G has a value.
Proof. We propose a following proof of the lemma. Both X and Y are convex
compact subsets of metric spaces and u is a continuous function, therefore by










u(x, y) ∈ R.
∀x ∈ X, u(x, .) : Y → R is a convex function, therefore f(y) := maxx∈X u(x, y)
is also a continuous convex function on Y . Similarly g(x) := miny∈Y u(x, y) is a
continuous concave function on X. By Theorem 2.37 in [7], f(y) and g(x) are
global maximum and minimum of u on X and Y for a given y ∈ Y and x ∈ X
respectively and vU is a global minimum of f on Y and vL is a global maximum










u(x, y) = u(x∗, y′). (2.7)
It follows from (2.6), (2.7) and previous discussion that
∀y ∈ Y : u(x′, y∗) ≤ u(x′, y), (2.8)
∀x ∈ X : u(x, y′) ≤ u(x∗, y′). (2.9)
Inequalities (2.8) and (2.9) specially hold true for (x′, y′) ∈ X × Y which
implies that
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vU = u(x′, y∗) ≤ u(x′, y′) ≤ u(x∗, y′) = vL,
so it must be that vL = vU and G has a value.
Let us notice that the point (x′, y′) ∈ X ×Y from the previous proof is a Nash
equilibrium of the game.
Results of the previous discussion may be, by the following theorem, without
loss of generality expanded to the class of constant-sum games.
Theorem 6 (Characterization of Nash equilibria in a constant-sum game). Let
G = (S1, S2, u) be a constant-sum game such that u1(s1, s2) = −u2(s1, s2) + c for
every s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2 and some c ∈ R. (s∗1, s∗2) ∈ S1 × S2 is a Nash equilibrium
of G, if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game H = (S1, S2, u1).
Proof.
Suppose H = (S1, S2, u1) has a Nash equilibrium (s∗1, s∗2) ∈ S1 ×S2 this means
that,
∀s1 ∈ S1 : u1(s∗1, s∗2) ≥ u1(s1, s∗2) (2.10)
and
∀s2 ∈ S2 : −u1(s∗1, s∗2) ≥ −u1(s∗1, s2). (2.11)
Inequality (2.11) holds, if and only if
∀s2 ∈ S2 : u2(s∗1, s∗2) = −u1(s∗1, s∗2) + c ≥ −u1(s∗1, s2) + c = u2(s∗1, s2) (2.12)
holds. (2.10) and (2.12) hold, if and only if (s∗1, s∗2) is a Nash equilibrium of
G = (S1, S2, u).
We call this Theorem the ”Characterization of Nash equilibria in a constant-
sum game”, because it shows, that the game’s property of having a Nash equilib-
rium is independent of the constant c and we can find Nash equilibria by solving
the characteristic zero-sum game. Or in other words, how willing to play certain
strategy each player is, only depends, on the slope of their payoff function in
that point, not on its relative height. In economy, this is known as the fact that
rational agents think in margins.
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2.2.2 Strictly dominated strategies
In this section we will briefly discuss the relation of strict dominance in a constant-
sum game.
Definition 7 (Strict dominance). Let G = (S1, S2, u) be a constant sum game.
If s1, s′1 ∈ S1, s1 ̸= s′1 and
∀s2 ∈ S2 : u1(s1, s2) > u1(s′1, s2),
we write s1 ≫S2 s′1 and say that strategy s1 strictly dominates s′1 given S2.
Similarly, if s2, s′2 ∈ S2, s2 ̸= s′2 and
∀s1 ∈ S1 : u2(s1, s2) > u2(s1, s′2),
we write s2 ≫S1 s′2 and say that strategy s2 strictly dominates s′2 given S1.
We will note that in addition to the strict dominance, there is also a weak
or very weak dominance defined similarly but instead of requiring strictly higher
payoff, we would require a payoff that is at least as high, as the one of the
dominated strategy. This however means, that results for such dominance are
not as strong, as for the strict dominance.
Strictly dominated strategies are such, for which exists some other strategy
that yields a higher payoff in every situation. This gives us a notion of rationality
in the game. Rational players would not play dominated strategies. In reality,
players tend to exhibit rationality only to some extend as was shown for example
in [9]. Strict dominance is a good way to identify strategies, which are not optimal
as we show in the following theorem, of which special case for the matrix games
was presented and proved in [7] (Theorem 7.20).
Theorem 7. Let G = (X, Y, u) be a zero-sum game in mixed strategies and let
P , Q be sets of pure strategies for the first and the second player respectively. Let
p ∈ P , q ∈ Q and P ′ := P\{p}, Q′ := Q\{q} then:
1. If ∃x′ ∈ X ′ = Conv(P ′) ⊆ X such that x′ ≫Y p and x∗ =
∑︁
p̂∈P λx∗(p̂)p̂ ∈
X is an optimal strategy of the first player, then λx∗(p) = 0.
2. If ∃y′ ∈ Y ′ = Conv(Q′) ⊆ Y such that y′ ≫X q and y∗ =
∑︁
q̂∈Q λy∗(q̂)q̂ ∈ Y
is an optimal strategy of the first player, then λy∗(q) = 0.
For briefness, we will only show the proof for the case of the first player, the
proof for the second player is similar.
Proof. Let x′ ∈ X ′ be such that x′ = ∑︁p′∈P ′ λx′(p′)p′ and x′ ≫Y p. Now let
x∗ = ∑︁p̂∈P λx∗(p̂)p̂ ∈ X be an optimal strategy. It follows from Lemma 2 that
G has a lower value vL = maxx∈X infy∈Y u(x, y) = infy∈Y u(x∗, y), which implies
that x∗ = arg maxx∈X infy∈Y u(x, y). Now suppose, that λx∗(p) > 0 we define
x̂ := ∑︁p′∈P ′ λx∗(p′)p′ + λx∗(p)x′ = ∑︁p′∈P ′ λx∗(p′)p′ + λx∗(p)∑︁p′∈P ′ λx′(p′)p′.
Clearly, x̂ is a well defined mixed strategy in X, for which we have the following
inequality
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λx∗(p′)u(p′, y) + λx∗(p)u(x′, y) = u(x̂, y).
(2.13)
Inequality (2.13) is a contradiction with the assumption that x∗ is an optimal
strategy, therefore it must be that λx∗(p) = 0.
Strict dominance may be used as a basis of solution algorithms of iterated
elimination of dominated strategies. Those algorithms in general games and their
properties were discussed by many authors, for example in [11], [6] or [8]. More
general approach to the problem was presented in [10], where authors generalized
this method to a general choice problem and provided conditions for the algorithm
to yield a unique maximal reduction.
2.2.3 Optimality in matrix games
Now we shall discuss results in the case of matrix games. Most important are fol-
lowing theorems. First, shows that every matrix game has a Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies. Second shows that it has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies,
if and only if the game’s matrix has a saddle point.
Theorem 8. Let G = (X, Y, uA) be a matrix game in mixed strategies, then exists
(x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y such that
x∗ ∈ BR(y∗) ∧ y∗ ∈ BR(x∗).
Proof.
Let G = (X, Y, uA) be a matrix game in mixed strategies. It follows that
X and Y are convex polyhedra, which means that both sets are compact and
convex. uA(x, y) := xT Ay is a bilinear form, so it is a concave function in x ∈ X
and convex function in y ∈ Y . Therefore, the satisfactory conditions for the
existence of value of G by Lemma 5 are fulfilled and by the Lemma 4, G has a
Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 9 ([7],Theorem 7.15.). Let G = (P, Q, uA) be a matrix game in pure
strategies with matrix A = (aij)m×n. G has a Nash equilibrium, if and only if
exists k ∈ I and l ∈ J such that
max{ail; i ∈ I} = akl = min{akj; j ∈ J}. (2.14)
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Proof.
”⇐”: Suppose that exists k ∈ I and l ∈ J , such that (2.14) holds, since
akl = (pk)T Aql, (2.15)
from the Definition 4, pk ∈ BR(ql) and ql ∈ BR(pk) and from the Defini-
tion 5, (pk, ql) ∈ P × Q is a Nash equilibrium.
”⇒”: Now suppose that there exists (pk, ql) ∈ P × Q a Nash equilibrium of
G. This means that pk ∈ BR(ql) = {p ∈ P ; ∀p′ ∈ P : pT Aql ≥ (p′)T Aql} and
ql ∈ BR(pk) = {q ∈ Q; ∀q′ ∈ Q : (pk)T Aq ≤ (pk)T Aq′} as both P and Q are
sets of pure strategies inequalities
∀p′ ∈ P : (pk)T Aql ≥ (p′)T Aql,
∀q′ ∈ Q : (pk)T Aql ≤ (pk)T Aq′,
may be rewritten as
∀i ∈ I : akl = (pk)T Aql ≥ (pi)T Aql = ail,
∀j ∈ J : akl = (pk)T Aql ≤ (pk)T Aqj = akj.
Or in other words akl satisfies (2.14).
From Theorem 8 and Lemma 3 we have that a matrix game with matrix A










We will consider the following function v : Rm ×Rn → R, that for a given m × n
matrix A gives the value of a matrix game in mixed strategies with A. Formally,





We would say that the player ’is solving’ or that ’we want to find a solution
of a matrix game’ with matrix A and we would mean, finding an strategy, that
yields v(A). As we will see from the following section, this may be attained
”independently” of the specific optimal strategy of the other player.
2.2.4 Formulation of the linear program
To find optimal strategies we use the mathematical programming. In the case
of matrix games such mixed strategies are solutions of a linear program (LP).
Standard methods on how to solve such programs may be found in [7] and other
optimization literature. We will formulate the LP for the first player, the LP for
the second player is equivalently derived from Definition 6 and Lemma 3. For a

















ρ is a feasible solution of (2.16) in x ∈ X, if and only if ∀y ∈ Y : xT Ay ≥ ρ
and specially it is true for all pure strategies qj , j ∈ J . As both sets of mixed
strategies are convex and u(x, .) : Y → R is linear for a given x ∈ X, it must
be that ∑︁mi=1 xiaij ≥ ρ, ∀j ∈ J is both satisfactory and necessary for (2.17), from






xiaij ≥ ρ, j ∈ J. (2.18)
This equivalent formulation is more convenient as it excludes the minimization
problem of the second player.
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3. Matrix games with random
payoff
In this chapter we will focus on defining a matrix game with random payoff and
providing instruments to classify and find optimal strategies in the case when the
players’ payoff depends, not only on their strategies, but on a random element as
well.
3.1 Random payoff
First we will define a random vector, random matrix and a closely related termi-
nology, which will be used in this chapter. We will use (Ω, A, P) to denote the
probability space.
Definition 8. (Basic terminology).
1. Let (Ω, A, P) be a probability space and (R, B, µ) be a measurable space.
Measurable map X : (Ω, A) → (R, B) we call a (real-valued) random vari-
able.
2. Let (Ω, A, P) be a probability space and (Rn, Bn, µ) be a measurable space.
Vector of random variables, X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn)T : (Ω, A) → (Rn, Bn),
we call a random vector.
3. Let (Ω, A, P) be a probability space and (Rmn, Bmn, µ) be a measurable space.
A = (aij)m×n we call a random matrix, if
A =
(︂
a11 a12 . . . a1n a21 . . . a2n . . . amn
)︂T
: (Ω, A) → (Rmn, Bmn)
is a random vector.
For a random variable X we will write X ∈ Ln and mean that E |X|n < ∞.
Without loss of generality, if A has a discrete distribution, we will denote the
different realizations of A as Ai and their probabilities pi = P[A = Ai], where
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} for some N ∈ N ∪ {∞} and we have that either Ai ≤ Ai+1 or
Ai ≰ Ai+1 & Ai+1 ≰ Ai for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. Furthermore, we will use the
convention that, if N = ∞, then {1, . . . , N} = N = {1, . . . , N − 1}.
We denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a vector X as FX
and by the CDF FA of a random matrix A we will mean the CDF of the random
vector A.
We formally defined a random matrix as a rearranged random vector. We
could have defined it separately, but this definition is more convenient for us, as
we can use the standard notation and operations as with random vectors, such
as the quantile function and ”≤” vector relation.
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Definition 9 (Matrix game with random payoff). Let (Ω, A, P) be a probability
space and A = (aij)m×n be a random matrix. We define uA : Ω × S1 × S2 → R
such that ∀s1 ∈ S1, ∀s2 ∈ S2, ∀ω ∈ Ω : uA(ω)(s1, s2) = sT1 A(ω)s2. The triple
G = (S1, S2, uA),
we call a matrix game with random payoff. By a realization of G in the case
of ω ∈ Ω we mean the deterministic matrix game G(ω) with the payoff function
uA(ω).
This definition expands the Definition 3 used in the previous chapter by intro-
ducing the concept of randomness into the definition of the matrix game. Thus,
deterministic matrix games may be thought of as matrix games with random
payoff, where the payoff matrix is constant almost surely. For more convenience
when we will speak of the realization of the game we will refer to it trough the
realization of the game’s matrix A.
3.2 Solution models for matrix games with ran-
dom payoff
The case of matrix games with random payoff differs from the case of deterministic
matrix games, as in contrary to the deterministic case, there may be several
different reasonable approaches on how to classify an optimal solution of such a
game. One may use a different model in every different situation, as it may be
interpreted as more suitable for the specific real-world problem that is studied.
In this section we will present standard approaches, how to classify and find
optimal strategies in matrix games with random payoff. We will model situation
when players have to choose their strategies before they know the evaluation of the
game. Such decisions are referred to as zero-order decisions or in some literature
as the first stage decisions, this terminology comes from the two (or possibly
multiple) stage formulation of the stochastic program. From characteristic of
such decisions, it follows that optimal strategies of both players are not functions
of ω.
3.2.1 Payoff’s distribution characteristics based models
Those are the most simple and presumably, the most intuitive models, which
players tend to use in a situation when their payoff is a random variable. In
those models players optimize their strategies with respect to some distribution
characteristic of the payoff matrix (or an approximation of it). As this character-
istic is a deterministic matrix, this transforms the problem to our original form
of deterministic matrix game, that was discussed in the second chapter.
Expected payoff model
This is the most simple model used to solve random matrix games. It is intuitive
and easy approach to deal with the randomness of the payoff. However, as we
will see, its results are not precise and the payoff, given optimal strategy, may be
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actually very bad in a sense, that the losses of the player may be very high, with
a high probability.
Let G = (X, Y, uA) be a matrix game in mixed strategies with random payoff
matrix A = (aij)m×n such that aij ∈ L1, i ∈ I, j ∈ J . Let us denote the expected
payoff matrix E := E A = (E aij)m×n = (ϵij)m×n. We say that strategy satisfies
(or is optimal in) the expected payoff model if it solves the deterministic matrix
game with matrix E.
Example. Suppose a game with random matrix An = (aij)2×2 with mutually
independent aij defined as a11 ∼ U(0, 1), a12 ∼ U(−1, 0), a21 ∼ U(−n, n − 1)
and a22 ∼ U(−n + 1, n), where n ∈ N and U(a, b) denotes a discrete uniform












and so the optimal strategy of the first player in the expected payoff model
would be x∗ = (0.5, 0.5)T and of the second player y∗ = (0.5, 0.5)T , but while
using this strategy, row player’s loss would be as high as −n/2 with non-zero
probability and for n ≫ 1, the payoff while using this strategy would be smaller
than 0 with probability close to 1/2. If the player would use a (1, 0)T as a strategy
instead, his payoff would be less than 0 with just a probability of 1/4 and it would
not exceed the loss of −1. This difference would be fatal in a situation when there
is a maximal limit L ∈ N, that the player can afford to lose and n > 2L (the
utility1 of the first player in a case when u(x, y) < L would be −∞). In such
a case for a high enough n, the strategy which is optimal in the expected payoff
model would be unplayable for a rational player.
Naive quantile payoff model
First, we need to formulate what we mean by a ”naive quantile matrix”.
Definition 10 (Naive quantile matrix). Let A = (aij)m×n be a random matrix,
such that every component of A has a marginal distribution function Faij . Let
us denote ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀h ∈ [0, 1] : F −1aij (h) := inf{b ∈ R; Faij (b) ≥ h},
that is, F −1aij is a quantile function of a random variable aij. If h ∈ [0, 1] and
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J : F −1aij (
mn
√





In some cases the naive quantile matrix is easier to compute than the actual
quantile matrix, but generally it is not quantile matrix and it does not satisfy
the quantile condition P[A ≤ A(h)] ≥ h. The following lemma shows, that it
is a quantile matrix in a case, when the elements of the matrix are mutually
independent.
Lemma 10. Let m, n ∈ N, h ∈ [0, 1] and A = (aij)m×n be a random matrix such
that aij are mutually independent random variables for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J . If A(h)
exists, then
1Utility is a theoretical function used in the decision theory, which measures the value, that
the agent gives to certain choices. In the game theory, it may or may not be equal to the payoff
function (depending on a situation and the interpretation of the payoff).
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P[A ≤ A(h)] := P[A ≤ A(h)] ≥ h. (3.1)
Furthermore, if aij are all continuous random variables, then (3.1) is satisfied
as an equation.
Proof. We have

































In the case, when aij are continuous F −1aij is a compositional inverse of Faij ,
therefore the inequality becomes equality.
Let G = (X, Y, uA) be a matrix game with m × n random matrix A for which
exists A(1−α), where α ∈ (0, 1] is a desired confidence level. We say, that a
strategy of the first player satisfies (is optimal in) the naive quantile payoff model
on a confidence level α, if it solves the deterministic matrix game with A(1−α).
Similarly, we say that strategy of the second player satisfies (is optimal in) the
naive quantile payoff model on a confidence level α, if it solves the deterministic
matrix game with A(α).
This model may be interpreted as the model that players would intuitively
use, if they knew only the marginal distributions of matrix A. If they knew the
distribution of A, they could use mn-dimensional quantiles in a similar manner,
however, as the topic of multidimensional quantiles is an extensive one, we will
not address it further in this thesis.
3.2.2 Chance-constrained programming based models
More precise models are based on the theory of chance-constrained programming.
Those models generalize the linear program (2.16) and (2.18) by introducing
probability into the constrains of the problem.
Now we will propose a categorization of those models based on the structure
of problem they solve from the point of view of the game theory.
Based on the type of the objective function of problems, that players are
solving we will refer to as
1. the payoff maximizing model, if it maximizes the payoff ρ of the player,
given some confidence level α ∈ (0, 1],
2. the confidence maximizing model, if it maximizes the confidence level α ∈
(0, 1], given some player’s desired payoff ρ ∈ R.
With respect to the bounds of the problem players are solving, we will refer to
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1. the worst payoff constrained model, if it is constrained by the probability
of the minimum payoff for the player,
2. the least likely payoff constrained model, if it is constrained by the minimum
probability of the payoff.
This categorization gives us four basic categories of models based on the
chance-constrained programming from the game theory’s point of view. From the
chance-constrained programming, we have two other standard categories, models
with joint or individual constrains, which reflects the position of the probability
operator in the problem that players want to solve. However, those two are not
always disjoint categories and may depend on the further properties of the model.
For example, if the random matrix has mutually independent elements, the joint
and individual constrains are equivalent in the worst payoff constrained models.
Payoff maximizing model with joint worst payoff constrains
This model is based on a chance-constrained programming problems for the first
and the second player defined as
max
x∈X, ρ∈R




τ subject to P[Ay ≤ τ1] ≥ β, (3.3)
for given confidence levels α, β ∈ (0, 1] of the first and the second player
respectively. Where 1 =
(︂
1, . . . , 1
)︂T
and we use a convention that 1 has
always a corresponding dimension.
Using results of the Chapter 3 of [1], under the assumption that A has a
discrete distribution with finitely many values, problems (3.2) and (3.3) may be
rewritten using our conventions in the form of following mixed integer programs
max
x∈X, ρ∈R,z∈{0,1}N
ρ subject to: ρ1 − ATk x ≤ ukzk, k = 1, . . . , N, (3.4)
N∑︂
k=1
pkzk ≤ 1 − α,




τ subject to: Aky − τ1 ≤ wkzk, k = 1, . . . , N, (3.5)
N∑︂
k=1
pkzk ≤ 1 − β,
zk ∈ {0, 1}, k = 1, . . . , N.
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Where uk and wk are vectors of constants, such that the corresponding in-
equality is feasible whenever zk = 1. In some literature uk and wk are referred
to as BigMs, the problem does not depend on their exact value, as long as the
corresponding bound is always feasible. This formulation of the problem may be
interpreted, as that the player ”chooses” in which of the realizations of A, he gets
a lower payoff than the optimal and they want, that the combined probability
of such realizations is less than or equal to the complement probability of their
confidence level.
This formulation is useful also in the case when the payoff matrix has large,
possibly countably infinite, support or in the case when it has a continuous distri-
bution. In those cases we can use standard statistical sampling methods to find
an approximation of its distribution with finite support and use it as a basis for
our mixed-integer programs to find approximate solutions of this model.
In further discussion we will denote ρ∗ the optimal value of (3.2) and τ ∗ the
optimal value of (3.3). In [5] authors gave conditions for ”weak duality” and
”strong duality” of players’ optimal values in this model to hold.
Theorem 11 ([5]; Theorem 3.0.1., ”Weak duality”). If α > 0.5 and β > 0.5 then
ρ∗ ≤ τ ∗.
Theorem 12 ([5]; Theorem 4.0.2., ”Strong duality” for a discrete distribution).
For any two confidence levels α, β, if there exists N0 ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} such that∑︁N




i=N0+1 pi < β ≤
∑︁N
i=N0 pi then ρ
∗ = τ ∗.
”Duality” in the case when A has a discrete distribution is somewhat stronger
as in the case when it has a continuous distribution. In Theorem 12 we did not
have to impose any explicit criteria on the confidence levels at which players play.
However, the existence of index N0 depends on them. In the case when A has
a continuous distribution we would explicitly require confidence levels to satisfy
α + β = 1.
Theorem 13 ([5]; Theorem 4.0.3., ”Strong duality” for a continuous distribu-
tion). If A has a continuous distribution which satisfies
1. for any two ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω : A(ω1) ≤ A(ω2) or A(ω1) ≥ A(ω2),
2. cumulative distribution function of A is strictly increasing
and α + β = 1, then ρ∗ = τ ∗.
For the proofs of Theorems 11, 12 and 13 we refer to [5].
From the previous discussion we see, that in fact, the ”strong duality” is, in
most cases, too strong requirement for matrix games with random payoff. As
we can suppose that rational players would require their confidence levels to be
above 0.5 and generally do not know the confidence level of the other player. In
some cases it would actually be reasonable to assume that their confidence levels
are close to 1. Fact, that in the most relevant cases, strong duality does not hold,
may be interpreted in a way, that players in reality play ”different games”. As we
will see in the following model, this interpretation is not as abstract, as it may
first seem.
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Payoff maximizing model with individual worst payoff constrains
Let G = (X, Y, uA) be a matrix game with random payoff matrix A = (aij)m×n
and sets of mixed strategies X and Y . Both players choose a confidence level




ρ subject to P[
m∑︂
i=1




τ subject to P[
n∑︂
j=1
aijyj ≤ τ ] ≥ βi, i ∈ I. (3.7)
Let Ai - the i-th row of A - and Aj - the j-th column of A - have discrete
distributions with Ni and Nj different realizations respectively for each i ∈ I and
j ∈ J and N1 =
∑︁
j∈J Nj, N2 =
∑︁
i∈I Ni. We denote pi(k), k = 1, . . . , Ni and
pj(k), k = 1, . . . , Nj the probabilities of the k-th realization of each row or column




subject to: ρ −
m∑︂
i=1
xiaij(k) ≤ uj(k)zj(k), j ∈ J, k = 1, . . . , Nj,
Nj∑︂
k=1
pj(k)zj(k) ≤ 1 − αj, j ∈ J








yjaij(k) − τ ≤ wi(k)zi(k), i ∈ I, k = 1, . . . , Ni,
Ni∑︂
k=1
pi(k)zi(k) ≤ 1 − βi, i ∈ I
zi(k) ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ I, k = 1, . . . , Ni,
where uj(k) and wi(k) are constants, such that the corresponding inequalities are
feasible whenever zj(k) = 1 and zi(k) = 1.
Generally, this is a different model than the previously discussed, as players
choose a confidence level for each specific pure strategy of the other player and as
aij do not have to be independent, those two models may yield different solutions.
This model is better in a situation, when it is reasonable to assume, that the other
player is less likely to play certain strategies than others.
In [4] authors further developed this model with the assumption that aij are
mutually independent. In that case it is also equivalent to the model with joint
constrains.
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As shown in their paper, with this assumption, players want to find an optimal
strategy for an optimal deterministic game, from a specific set of feasible games.
To show this, authors proved several lemmas and theorems. We will only
mention the most important of them, for more detailed discussion we will refer
to [4].
In [4] (Lemma 1), authors proved the following equivalence for the first player.




xiaij ≥ ρ] ≥ αj, (3.10)




{aij ≥ γij, ∀i ∈ I}) ≥ αj,
where




In Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 they showed sufficient and necessary conditions for
above equivalence to hold. First, if there exist γij ∈ R, i ∈ I, j ∈ J such that
m∏︂
i=1
P[aij ≥ γij] ≥ αj and
m∑︂
i=1
xiγij ≥ ρ (3.11)
then ρ and x satisfy (3.10).




P[aij < γij] ≥ αj,
m∑︂
i=1
xiγij ≥ ρ. (3.12)
Analogous conditions may be derived for the second player. The only differ-
ence is the change of corresponding inequalities.
It follows from [4], Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, that the studied problem (3.6) is










(1 − Faij (γij) + δij) ≥ αj, j ∈ J.
Where Γ = (γij)m×n and δij = P[aij = γij]2.
We see that this transformed our former problem to the form of finding an
optimal deterministic matrix game with matrix Γ which satisfies
m∏︂
i=1
(1 − Faij (γij) + δij) ≥ αj, j ∈ J.
2In their original paper authors worked with left continuous CDF, so they did not have to
include the δij term. Also note that in the case when aij are continuous random variables
δij = 0.
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Similarly, the problem of for the second player may be rewritten as the problem
of finding an optimal deterministic game with matrix Φ = (ϕij)m×n that satisfies
n∏︂
j=1
Faij (ϕij) ≥ βi, i ∈ I.
We denote
T1 := {Γ ∈ Rm×n;
m∏︂
i=1
(1 − Faij (γij) + δij) ≥ αj, j ∈ J},
T2 := {Φ ∈ Rm×n;
n∏︂
j=1
Faij (ϕij) ≥ βi, i ∈ I},
T := T1 ∩ T2.
T1 and T2 are sets of feasible games for the first and the second player re-
spectively. In their Theorem 1, authors showed that inequality payoff constrains
of (3.11) and (3.12) may be replaced with equality constrains.
We will denote Γ∗ and Φ∗ optimal games and x∗ and y∗ their optimal strategies
for each player respectively. It is easy to show that v(.), as defined in the end
of our Chapter 1, is a non-decreasing function. In [4], authors showed this in
Theorem 2 and its corollary. In their Theorem 3 and its corollary they also
showed that, if in each column or row there is at least one continuous random
variable, all inequalities in constrains of (3.11) and (3.12) may be replaced with
equalities.
Further discussion was on the relations of deterministic games that will the
individual players ”play”. In Theorem 4 and its Corollary authors showed that
in cases, which are in reality the most interesting, that is, when the confidence
levels are above 0.5, set T is empty, that is, both players have different sets of
feasible games, which is a result similar to the one from previous model. In [4],
Theorem 5 shows that in fact, in this case γij < ϕij for all i ∈ I; j ∈ J and any
two Γ ∈ T1, Φ ∈ T2. Which means that v(Γ) < v(Φ) for any two Γ ∈ T1, Φ ∈ T2.
If we denote v∗1 := v(Γ∗) and v∗2 := v(Φ∗) the optimal values of the optimal
games for first and second player respectively, Theorem 8 in [4] shows that for
any two Γ ∈ T1 and Φ ∈ T2, v∗2 − v∗1 ≤ max(ϕij) − max(γij) or v∗2 − v∗1 ≤
maxi( 1n
∑︁n
j=1 ϕij) − maxj( 1m
∑︁m
i=1 γij). Those inequalities may be interpreted as
approximations of gaps in optimal values of game for the first and the second
player.
Solutions in pure strategies. Previous discussion gives us a better under-
standing of properties of feasible games for each player in this model, from them
we can now get conditions for pure strategy solutions of this model.
We denote γ̂ij = max{γij; 1 − Faij (γij) + δij ≥ αj}, ϕ̂ij = min{ϕij; Faij (ϕij) ≥
1 − βi} and Γ̂ = (γ̂ij)m×n, Φ̂ = (ϕ̂ij)m×n. It is easy to show that generally Γ̂ /∈ T1
and Φ̂ /∈ T2 because if Γ̂ ∈ T1 then it would have to be true that for all j ∈ J
m∏︂
i=1
(1 − Faij (γ̂ij) + δ̂ij) ≥ (αj)m ≥ αj,
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which implies that αj = 1. Similarly for the Φ̂.
For this reason if Γ̂ has a saddle at γ̂kr we define γ̃ij := γ̂ij if j ∈ J , i = k and
γ̃ij := −∞ else. Now let Γ̃ := (γ̃ij)m×n, then Γ̃ ∈ T1 as
m∏︂
i=1
(1 − Faij (γ̃ij) + δ̃ij) = αj
Theorem 14 ([4],Theorem 10). Let Γ̂ and Γ̃ be defined as above. If v(Γ̂) = v(Γ̃)
then pk ∈ P is a solution of (3.13).
Proof. Proof similar to this was presented in [4].
From the definition of Γ̂, we have ∀Γ ∈ T1 : Γ̂ ≥ Γ and from the fact that v is
a non-decreasing function of Γ we have v(Γ̂) ≥ v(Γ).Therefore, if v(Γ̃) = v(Γ̂) we
also have that v(Γ̃) ≥ v(Γ) for all Γ ∈ T1 and as Γ̃ ∈ T1, it is the optimal game
for the first player with only one optimal strategy pk therefore pk is the optimal
solution of (3.13).
From this theorem we have that if Γ̂ has a sadle point in a row k then the pk
is an optimal strategy of the first player in our original problem (3.6). Similar
argument may be made for the second player.
Payoff maximizing model with individual least likely payoff constrains
The last of models we will discuss is the payoff maximizing model with individual
least likely payoff constrains. This model is less cautious and based on a axiom,
that the payoff aij happens with probability of xiyj, this results in a following
formulation of the problems players want to solve. Let G = (X, Y, uA) be a matrix






xi P[aij ≥ ρ] ≥ αj, j ∈ J, (3.14)






yj P[aij ≤ τ ] ≥ βi, i ∈ I, (3.15)
for given confidence levels βi ∈ (0, 1], i ∈ I.
Assuming that each aij has a finitely many values, aij(1), . . . , aij(Nij) if we de-
note pij(n) = P[aij = aij(n)] and N =
∑︁
i∈I,j∈J Nij, then using methods presented









xipij(k)zij(k) ≤ 1 − αj, j ∈ J,
zij(k) ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k = 1, . . . , Nij,
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where uij(k) is a constant such that the corresponding inequality is satisfied
whenever zij(k) = 1.









yjpij(k)zij(k) ≤ 1 − βi, i ∈ I,
zij(k) ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k = 1, . . . , Nij,
where wij(k) is a constant such that the corresponding inequality is satisfied
whenever zij(k) = 1.
This model was first presented in [3] where authors studied its connection
with the corresponding confidence maximizing model. Model with similar idea
but with joint constraints and the assumption of a specific distributions of aij
was studied in [2].
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4. Numeric study
In this chapter we will focus on applications of previously developed theory. We
will formulate a real-world motivated problem and use different techniques pre-
sented in the third chapter of this thesis to solve it.
4.1 Formulating the problem
We will consider a case of duopoly of two electricity providers. We will assume,
that each day both companies decide how much power to generate and that energy
consumption each day is given by the same random demand.
Let us denote the two companies A and B. We assume, that due to the gov-
ernment regulations, non of the companies has a power to change the price of one
GWh of energy on the market. Both A and B have different power plants which
they can use to generate power, each of those with different production efficiency
resulting in different power costs and each day they can either produce energy or
not.
Each of the two is currently making some portion of the whole market and to
sustain it, the company wants to form at least that portion of the overall profit
on the market. Therefore, if we denote PA, PB profits of the two companies at a
specific day and r ∈ (0, 1) the portion of the market currently held by company
A, their payoffs will be uA = PA − r(PA + PB) and uB = PB − (1 − r)(PA + PB) =
−PA + r(PA + PB) = −uA respectively. As uA + uB = 0 for any pair (PA, PB)
this is a well defined zero-sum game. In fact, as we will show, we can represent
this competition as a matrix game with random payoff.
If running, the amount of electricity produced by each plant is given by the
following table.
Power plant Watter Coal Nuclear
Energy produced daily [GWh] 30 20 50
Now let s ∈ R be the selling price of 1 GWh of electricity on the market in
millions of EUR. We denote p = (pW , pC , pN)T ∈ {0, 1}3 the vector of indicators
of which plants are being used by the company A and cA ∈ R3 the vector of
daily costs of energy production per plant, expressed in millions of EUR, for the
company A. Similarly, for the company B, q ∈ {0, 1}3 and cB ∈ R3. Furthermore,
let o = (oW , oC , oN)T ∈ R3 be the daily output of each power plant given by the
previous table, expressed in GWh.
If we assume that every day at least one plant must be running, both com-
panies have 7 different pure strategies, we will denote them as i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 7},
where the indicator vector pi = (piW , piC , piN)T corresponding to the given pure
strategy i is determined by the binary form of i with formula i = piW 22 + piC21 +
piN20 and similarly for the company B. Both companies know that the elements
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of the payoff matrix are in the form
aij =(1 − r)(s(pTi o +
pTi o
(pi + qi)T o
min(0, C − pTi o − qTj o)) − pTi cA) (4.1)
− r(s(qTj o +
qTi o
(pi + qi)T o
min(0, C − pTi o − qTj o)) − qTi cB),
where C denotes the random demand for electricity and dA, dB are vectors of daily
costs per power plant for the company A and B respectively. We will assume that
C has a discrete distribution with finitely many values from {C1, . . . , Ck}, where
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} : Cj ∈ N and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} : Cj < Cj+1.
As all aij depend on the same distribution of C, A may be represented as a
measurable function of C with finitely many realizations A(C1), ..., A(Ck) with
their respective probabilities. We will assume that ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} : P[C = Cj] =
P[D = j], where D ∼ Bi(k, p) for some probability p ∈ [0, 1].
4.2 Solutions of the problem




Costs for A [cA] (10, 10, 40/3)T
Costs for B [cB] (20/3, 10, 40/3)T
Selling price [s] 1
We will consider C with values in {100, 101, . . . , 120} and their respective
probabilities are given by D ∼ Bi(21, 0.7). Therefore, C may be expressed as a
simple linear transformation of D with C = 99 + D.
From this we have expected value and variance of C given as
E C = 99 + E D = 99 + 0.7 · 21 = 113.7
and
var(C) = var(99 + D) = var(D) = 21 · 0.7 · 0.3 = 4.41
respectively.
With those set parameters we can now compute the exact pure strategy solu-
tions in different models we studied in the Chapter 3.
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4.2.1 Solution in the expected payoff model
From the above parameters and the linearity of expectation operator, we can
compute each element of the expected payoff matrix ϵij as
E aij =(1 − r)(s(pTi o +
pTi o
(pi + qi)T o
E min(0, C − pTi o − qTj o)) − pTi cA) (4.2)
− r(s(qTj o +
qTi o
(pi + qi)T o
E min(0, C − pTi o − qTj o)) − qTi cB),
where
E min(0, C − pTi o − qTj o) =
21∑︂
k=1





· 0.7k · 0.321−k.
From this we have the expected payoff matrix E with the precision of two
decimal places in the form⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
12.22 21.11 8.36 17.78 4.72 14.44 2.22
−5.56 3.33 −8.89 0 −12.22 −3.33 −14.51
17.31 27.78 11.17 24.44 7.38 19.54 4.47
1.11 10 −2.22 6.67 −5.55 3.33 −7.22
20.96 34.44 14.96 31.10 11.17 23.18 8.19
7.78 16.67 3.92 13.33 0.28 10 −2.22
20.12 37.96 14.54 30.67 10.82 22.34 7.84
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
E has a saddle point in ϵ57, therefore, by the Theorem 9, the optimal pure
strategy of the first player in this model is i∗ = 5 and of the second player
j∗ = 7, which corresponds with vectors pi∗ = (1, 0, 1)T and qi∗ = (1, 1, 1)T . So
the optimal strategy in the expected payoff model for the first player is to run
water and nuclear plants and for the second player to run all three plants. In
this case non of the players has an incentive to diverge from their strategy, as
both would earn less (lose more in the case of the second player). The optimal
payoff for the company A in this case is approximately 8.19 and for the company
B −8.19. This number may be interpreted as the payoff, that each company is
expected to earn/lose using this strategy.
4.2.2 Solution in the naive quantile payoff model
In this model, we want to find a deterministic matrices A(1−α) and A(β). We will
consider α = 0.95 for the first company and β = 0.95 for the second company. To
find those matrices we need to find individual quantiles of elements of A. We will
denote C(h) the h-quantile of C. As aij are functions of C to find their quantiles
we distinguish three cases.
1. aij is a non-decreasing function of C in this case h-quantile of aij is equal
to aij(C(h)),
2. aij is a constant function of C, in this case the h-quantile of aij is eaqual
to the value aij,
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3. aij is a non-increasing function of C, in this case the h-quantile of aij is
equal to aij(C(1 − h)).
From the Formula (4.1) we have that this depends on the sign of
k(i, j) := (1 − r)pTi o − rqTi o
and aij is non-decreasing, if k(i, j) > 0, aij is constant, if k(i, j) = 0 and aij is
non-increasing, if k(i, j) < 0. This is due to the fact, that k gives the sign in front
of the minimum term in (4.1). The minimum itself is a non-decreasing function
of C for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J , so if k is negative (4.1) is non-increasing function of
C, if k = 0, then aij does not depend on C.
With parameters as were set in the previous section we have that a17(C) =
20/9 and a67(C) = −20/9 are constant, a21, a23, a25, a26, a27, a43, a45 and a47 are
non-increasing and rest are non-decreasing functions of C.
Solution from the first player’s perspective
The first player in this model wants to find a deterministic matrix A(1−α) and
solve deterministic matrix game defined by it. From previous discussion we can
compute naive quantile matrix
A(1−α) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
12.22 21.11 8.64 17.78 4.89 14.44 2.22
−5.56 3.33 −8.89 0 −12.22 −3.33 −13.89
18.14 27.78 11.72 24.44 7.82 20.36 4.73
1.11 10.00 −2.22 6.67 −5.56 3.33 −6.84
21.89 34.44 15.62 31.11 11.72 24.11 8.56
7.78 16.67 4.19 13.33 0.44 10.00 −2.22
21.22 39.61 15.38 32.11 11.56 23.44 8.39
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
This matrix has the saddle point in 5-th row and 7-th column, therefore
the optimal strategy for the first player is the same as the optimal strategy in
the expected payoff model i∗ = 5. The company A has a optimal payoff of
approximately 8.56 in this model.
Solution from the second player’s perspective




12.22 21.11 8.81 17.78 4.99 14.44 2.22
−5.56 3.33 −8.89 0 −12.22 −3.33 −13.39
18.64 27.78 12.06 24.44 8.09 20.86 4.89
1.11 10.00 −2.22 6.67 −5.37 3.33 −6.53
22.45 34.44 16.02 31.11 12.06 24.68 8.78
7.78 16.67 4.36 13.33 0.55 10.00 −2.22




A(β) also has a saddle point in 5-th row and 7-th column, therefore the optimal
strategy of the company B in this model is j∗ = 7 and the corresponding optimal
value is −8.78.
It should not surprise us that A(1−α) ≤ A(β). This is due to the fact that in the
”ideal” situation, when aij are mutually indepenedent, they would attain values
higher than a(1−α)ij with probability of α and lower than a
(β)
ij with probability of
β. So those two matrices in that case form approximate bounds of values of A.
4.2.3 Solutions in chance-constrained programming based
models
Now we will use methods of chance-constrained programming to find optimal
solutions for this game. In this case we want to find and optimal payoff value
for each company, therefore we will solve the payoff maximization problems with
three different types of constrains
1. joint worst payoff constrains,
2. individual worst payoff constrains,
3. individual least likely payoff constrains.
As our matrix A is a discrete random variable with finitely many values, we
can transform the problem to the forms of mixed integer programs (3.4) and (3.5)
in the first case, (3.8) and (3.9) in the second case and (3.16) and (3.17) in the
last case.
In reality, it would be very unreasonable to use the least likely payoff con-
strained model with individual constrains in this case, as elements of the matrix
are strongly correlated. In fact, they all are functions of the same random vari-
able. This model is also computationally extensive and as we will see, in this
case, it gives us the least precise results, that are only numerical approximations
of pure strategies.
Joint worst payoff constrains
In this case we will use confidence levels α = β = 0.95 and optimize with respect
to realizations of the matrix A. We would require the constraints to be violated
in those realizations of A that will occur with maximum probability of 0.05.
With those parameters we get a solution i∗ = 5 for the first and j∗ = 7 for
the second player, which corresponds with the solutions of the expected payoff
and naive quantile models. In this model the optimal payoff for the company
A would be approximately 7.78 and for the company B −8.56. Those are the
minimal/maximal payoffs companies would earn/lose in 95 out of 100 plays of
this game. The company A would in 95 out of 100 cases earn more and the
company B would lose less than those numbers.
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Individual worst payoff constrains
In this model we want to maximize the payoff with respect to realizations of each
column or row of the payoff matrix A. We will use j ∈ J , i ∈ I : αj = βi =
7
√
0.95 ∼ 0.993 as the confidence levels for each player and each row or column.
With those set parameters we attain an optimal solution for the first player
i∗ = 2 and for the second player j∗ = 2. This would correspond with both
companies running just the coal plants. The optimal payoff in this case would be
approximately 3.33 for the company A and approximately −3.33 for the company
B. In this case both companies optimize with respect to each strategy of the other
company, this results in a lower optimal values of the game. This is however not
very efficient model to use as the columns and rows of A are strongly correlated.
Individual least likely payoff constrains
We solved this model with confidence levels i ∈ I, j ∈ J : αj = βi = 7
√
0.95 ∼
0.993. As we mentioned before, this model is not suitable for this exact problem.
We want to maximize the payoff with respect to the every realization of each
element of the matrix and require the convex combination of probabilities of
realizations, for which the constrains are violated to not exceed the corresponding
complementary probability. This is unreasonably computationally extensive and
as axioms of the model are strongly violated in this case, results are not exact.
With such parameters we get an approximate solution of i∗ = 1 for the com-
pany A and of j∗ = 2 for the company B. This would correspond with the
company A running just the nuclear plant and the company B running just the
coal plant. The optimal payoff values in this model would be approximately 0
for the company A and approximately −3.33 for the company B. This is however
not exact at all, as in every realization of A elements in the first row are higher
than 0.
Discussion of results
From the three chance-constrained programming based models, we saw the best
performance of the model with joint constrains. This is due to the fact that
joint constraints in this case are reflecting that A is a function of a single random
demand C. We considered, that there is no reason to believe, that the other player
would not play certain strategies. If it was reasonable to assume, that the other
company would tend not to use specific pure strategies, in models with individual
constrains, the company could set low confidence levels to the corresponding pure
strategies. In such a case the individual constrains may perform better overall
than the joint constrains. From this, it is apparent, that when we want to find
the most suitable model for a specific problem, we would also require expert
judgement and non-mathematical analysis of the problem.
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5. Conclusion
In this thesis we studied a special case of zero-sum games in the form of matrix
games. We discussed the general theory of constant-sum, zero-sum and matrix
games. We showed that zero-sum games are an important class of constant-sum
games and we can use the broadly developed theory of zero-sum games to study
constant-sum games as well. We presented several possible approaches to form
a suitable solution model for a matrix game with random payoff, discussed their
properties and applied them to solve a real-world motivated problem.
5.1 Main results of our thesis
In the Chapter 2, we formulated the terminology of constant-sum games and dis-
cussed their special cases. We provided proofs for Lemmas 4 and 9 and formulated
and proved key properties of constant-sum and matrix games in Theorems 6, 7, 8
and 9. In this Chapter, we also formulated the linear program of the first player
(2.16) in a matrix game and its equivalent form (2.18).
In the Chapter 3, we defined a matrix game with random payoff and pre-
sented several solution models for this category of games. First we discussed the
properties of the Expected payoff model and showed why it may not be a suitable
solution model, then we proposed the ”Naive quantile” payoff model as a sim-
ple alternative to this model. Later we introduced more sophisticated solution
models based on the theory of chance-constrained programming. We provided
the basic categorization of those models and then we examined three of payoff
maximizing models in more detail. For each of examined models we formulated
equivalent mixed-integer programs that players want to solve in the case when
the payoff matrix is a discrete random variable with finite support of reasonable
size.
In the Chapter 4, we formulated a model example of two energy providers
on a closed market with random demand. We ”zero-summed” this problem and
used methods developed in theoretical chapters of this thesis to analyze it. In
our problem, three of used models yielded same solutions, this was due the fact
that the payoff matrix in this case has a strong saddle point, which is not much
affected by its randomness. That makes this solution a strong one, as it does not
fully depend on the selected solution model. We also showed that models with
individual constrains are not suitable for this problem as their basic axioms are
violated by the strong correlation of elements of the matrix and the fact that
there is no clear incentive to believe that the other player would prioritize some
strategies over others. We also managed to show, that the Naive quantile payoff
model, in this case, yields a reasonable approximation of optimal values that each
player receives by the model with joint worst payoff constrains despite the fact,
that we cannot assume independence of elements of the matrix.
33
5.2 Potential for further development
There are several possible ways to further develop this thesis.
In the theoretical part of the thesis there is a big potential in the study of the
multidimensional quantiles and their application in solution models. Other paths
to develop solution models to consider, were also presented in [3] and [2]. In the
first case, authors provided specific solution algorithm for the models with least
likely individual constrains in the case when the payoff matrix has a continuous
distribution. In [2], author studied models with least likely joint constrains, he
was able to provide some further results in the case when the payoff matrix has
a specific type of marginal distributions. We see a potential in developing this
model in the case when it has a discrete distribution with finite support. Another
possible development of this theory would be the use of a stochastic dominance.
This would require the generalization of results mentioned in the Section 2.2. of
the Chapter 2 to the case when the payoff is a random variable. One possible
approach to this would be to use a definition of dominance on some prescribed
confidence level and try to asses its implications for matrix games with random
payoff. Biggest goal to achieve would be to either proof or disproof the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in the general matrix game with random payoff, this was, to
the best of our knowledge, not done yet. Lastly there is a potential in developing
the theory of matrix games with random payoff for matrices of infinite dimensions.
In the numeric example we see the main possibility of advancement in studying
a case with larger payoff matrix and in comparison of this formulation of the
problem and its predictions with real-world data on the strategies, that are used
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